Rocketeer leads reason to permit it to doubt the effectiveness of Russian nuclear attack on America

[DARPA]

Unfortunately, the "turn into radioactive ash" of the planet (and the US territory, including) Russian nuclear potential is quite able. You can certainly plenty to amuse himself with the hope that a "powerful missile defense" (without a difference, Russian, American, whether) will not miss a single warhead, but it is not. I will try to explain why the defense at the present stage of development can be solved only limited tactical problems, but it can not protect in the event of a full-fledged nuclear missile conflict with hundreds of vehicles and thousands of ammunition.





Let's start with the basics. How and where to fly a ballistic missile? Its "life cycle", so to speak, is short - she lives in flight, and the flight, depending on the distance to the target from the launch pad lasts from 40 minutes to 2 hours.



Start.

Here everything is clear. Rocket leaves PU (launcher), which may or mine, ultra-secure (designed to withstand a nuclear blast of average power at a distance of up to 200 m) or mobile (such only in Russia, the United States abandoned a similar program "Midzhitmen") or submarine (SSBN with the traditional layout of both countries on 16 rockets on the boat). Russian SSBN can throw all 16 2-3 minutes, the American "Ohio" - 4-6 (salvos 4 pcs.)

Active stage - working boosters first stage, the rocket goes into near space. At this stage it is most noticeable in all ranges, but still difficult to assess, which aims. Make it can only satellite in geostationary orbit, and it is very approximate. The duration of the acceleration of about 2-3 minutes. (depends on the energy of fuel, the starting mass of the rocket and so on., but averaged we assume so). It was at this moment, flare rocket engine infrared sensors to pinpoint satellite early warning of missile attack, placed in geostationary and highly elliptical orbits. And the work begins proper defense.

Next: reset the first stage, the second stage of operation of the engine (10-20 minutes) access to the apogee of the orbit. At an altitude of 100-200 km missile is guided to the target area and reaches a maximum speed (8-10 thousand. Km / h or 2.7-3 km / sec). In this step (duration about 10 minutes) it maximally vulnerable because its maneuverability and small missile defense system using zagorizontalnyh radar and high-speed computers can calculate the flight path and give a probability estimate for the further development of events ...

At this stage begin to operate the first elements of anti-missile defense: apogee, further flight ballistic curve, breeding and guidance warheads, reset false warheads and passive jamming. 20-40 minutes - entry into the atmosphere. Warhead (set of warheads and decoys) decreases at a rate of 4-6 M, at an angle of 40-60 degrees. In this modern warheads have some room for maneuver in the atmosphere and according to some sources even stochastic choice between 2-3 goals. This stage is very short - 2-5 minutes to HRC *. The goal is 200-300 km.



Actually HRC. (Fox)

The best chance to destroy the missile - at the stage of climax. During operation, the 1st and 2nd stages defense just did not have time to even get the order to destroy, and it will be, in the case of Russia, on Russian territory (IDB positioning areas at a distance of 800 to 3000 km from the borders of the Russian Federation) . At the stage of reduction of atmospheric - warhead (diameter 40-50cm, length 1 m, these are the dimensions in modern 100-400 kiloton) intercept will be possible only when modern science has learned to catch basketballs that fly on the 6 speed of sound, with provided that they also dodge.

Or - "weapons of last resort" missiles with nuclear b / h, which will explode in front warhead over its territory. I do not know how many missiles the US (before it was a rocket, "Nike", but they are out of date), but Russia - a few hundred, not only in the complex defense of Moscow, at the same time covering the IDB and positioning areas near Kaluga and Ivanovo, but armed with air defense systems C300-PSV (strategic / altitude), divisions that cover large Russian cities and strategically important areas.

It is possible that such a high-rise explosion (even if, as we are assured modern nuclear physicists, it will be "clean" with a minimum output of polluting radioisotopes) prejudice slightly less than the land of the warhead. Just look at the consequences of the Chelyabinsk meteorite exploded at an altitude of about 30 km above the sparsely populated region. The probability of hitting modern American anti-climax on stage, in the ideal, field conditions (without suppression, the goal does not reset the traps and decoys, and do not attack missile base "green men" cruise missile attack submarines and other terrorist "friends") - 0 6.

Means for secure destruction will need to deploy at least two foreign defense and let a pair of missiles each at the target. But here comes in geography ...

Consider first the land-based ballistic missiles. Most potential trajectories leading from Russia to America, taking into account the curvature of the earth's surface - run through the polar regions. And there deploy two tier - will not work, because simply nowhere. There Greenland, Newfoundland, the coast of Alaska and Canada from the United States. There Novaya Zemlya, Arctic coast of Russia - in Russia. On the ice, such systems do not deploy, possibly under the ice? But there is always the risk that the media will not be able to float and turn around time. Hardened ice at the polar caps sometimes reaches 5-10 meters thick.

Remains quite fantastic option for construction of floating platforms of ice class launch vehicles (a kind of cross between "Sea Launch" with an icebreaker), but they are vulnerable to the same multi-purpose submarines of the enemy, attacking from beneath the icy crust. Do not forget about the peculiarities of the circumpolar magnetic field that impede the use of radio-electronic means of guidance in this area.

What and where can "throw on the table" Russia? Will not operate warheads, but only launch vehicle (warhead as far as mentioned above, can intercept only in the works of science fiction), but the rocket - you can try to destroy it. As of January 2014 Russia had 395 land-based intercontinental ballistic missile carriers (203 - mobile, others - in ultra-secure silos, also covered with a Tatischevo Kozelsk and the Moscow area of missile defense, and the remaining regions - C-300 PSV base areas (Irkutsk, Orenburg).

Also in active operation seven SSBN 16 missiles each. But SSBN is delicate matter more complicated to analyze, you just have to say that on alert, constantly in the position area may be only 2 of 7. In an emergency 4-5. Those will add them to the total of 32 rocket salvo in the ideal (if not destroyed before launch, t. To., And for the Soviet and American SSBN being a constant game of cat and mouse by the multi-purpose submarines opponent). So let's leave the Soviet submarine component as the Joker, although very, very dangerous, t. To. 32 missiles - it's almost 100 warheads.

All accumulated volley allowed, of course, will not (exclude the case of acute seizure when You-Know-Who in the mirror seemed Obama presses the button), but about half can be started. In this class ICBM "Topol" are monoblock warhead in the first place because their goal - namely breakthrough PRO + on the requirements of the SALT I had to balance the number of carriers / warheads. We take a "conditional discharge" 200 missiles (something not fly, although experiments show high reliability of Soviet missiles with UR-100 and F-36 crashes at start-up was not at all, with the sea and the P-26 "Topol" no more than 2 with the number of different kinds of runs more than 100 for each type, ie. e. the reliability of 99 percent). The probability of passing their first line defense, provided that each missile will be fired a couple of «Standart», will be about 0.16. The United States will need to have on duty these 400 missiles, to ensure their infrastructure, guidance systems, etc. E., Up to 32 missiles will "blossom" and is very lucky, if in step dilution or detonating a nuclear counter b / h will be able to destroy at least another decade.

22 remain "wet" missiles. Depending on the class, it is from 1 to 220 potential explosions. Meanwhile, in order to undermine the economic potential of such a large geographical distribution of countries like the US, Russia or China - enough for even 3-4 warheads. As you can see, the effect is achieved repeatedly. This kind of miscalculation and will have a retroactive effect, by the way ...

In fact, that is why in the early '70s, with the advent of the first ballistic missiles with maneuvering warheads, the USSR went so far as to limit their development. Not from a huge peace, but simply because it was a clear technological and geographical deadlock, and the strategy of "mutually assured destruction" proposed another Robert McNamara, remained unchanged and remains relevant even now (of course while maintaining the adequacy of the conditions of the parties, decision-makers).

Just because the chance to avoid retaliation with "acceptable damage" - NO. So, let's hope that the survival instinct will even You-Know-Who.